Many countries, in an effort to address the problem that too many retirees have too little saved up, impose mandatory contributions into retirement accounts, that too, in an age-independent manner. This is puzzling because such funded pension schemes effectively mandate the young, who wish to borrow, to save for retirement. Further, if agents are present-biased, they disagree with the intent of such schemes and attempt to undo them by reducing their own saving or even borrowing against retirement wealth. We establish a welfare case for mandating the middle-aged and the young to contribute to their retirement accounts, even with ageindependent contribution rates. We find, somewhat counter-intuitively, that pitted against laissez faire, mandatory pensions succeed by incentivizing the young to borrow more and the middle-aged to save nothing on their own, in effect, rendering the latter's present-biasedness inconsequential.
Introduction
Most individuals, on their own, do not save adequately for their retirement (Diamond, 1977; Poterba, 2014) . Standard models of life-cycle consumption have di¢ culty rationalizing this undersaving especially in the context of retirement savings. In an e¤ort to overcome this hurdle, researchers have incorporated elements of present-biasedness in the preferences of individuals.
Prominent among such attempts have been the inclusion of myopia (Feldstein, 1985;  Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2011) and time-inconsistency (Laibson et. al. 1998 ) in people's preferences.
These endeavors -see Chetty (2015) -often utilize a) the notion that individuals are comprised of multiple selves, possibly in con ‡ict with one another, and b) the construct of a chasm between a self's "true preferences"(experienced utility), that which he uses to determine how much he should save, versus his "choice" or "behavioral" preferences (decision utility), that which determines how much he actually saves. 1 The latter can help rationalize the gap between actual and best-intention saving if, for example, the choice preferences of the current self attach a lower weight on future utility than his true preferences do -this is present-bias from the standpoint of the true self.
There may be disagreements between the choice preferences of the current self and his future selves. Time-inconsistent preferences (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) help explain the gap between what the current, decision-making self wishes a future self to save and what that self, when his turn to decide arrives, actually does. Here, the choice preferences exhibit preference reversal : the future self, for example, may wish to revise downward the previous self's forward-looking, bestintention saving plans -this is undersaving, from the standpoint of the previous self. 2 Cognizant of the impending preference reversal, a sophisticated self may seek commitment devices, such as mandatory pensions, to help his future selves stick to his better judgment about retirement saving -see Summers (1989), Laibson et. al. (1998) , and Kaplow (2008) . The agent, so the argument goes, uses the commitment device, ends up with more retirement wealth, and is made better o¤.
Evidently, present-biasedness and time inconsistency preferences can rationalize private undersaving in lifecycle models. What is not apparent, at least not in theory, is whether pension mandates leave the agent with increased retirement wealth. The reason is, with perfect capital markets, present-biased individuals can o¤set the mandated saving by reducing their own, even one-for-one -if need be, borrow against their future pension wealth -leaving total retirement wealth unchanged, possibly lower. (This "ine¤ectiveness" result is well-known in the theoretical pensions literature -see Gale, 1998 .) Which raises the question, why are they so popular? 3 This 1 Myopia means the agent places less weight on the future than his true preferences would suggest while timeinconsistent preferences imply preference reversal : the relative weight placed by the current self on current versus future utility changes as the lifecycle proceeds. 2 For expositional ease, the introduction restricts the discussion only to time-inconsistent preferences exhibiting preference-reversal across choice selves. As the body of the paper will make clear, all major assertions will also be true under myopia, present bias from the standpoint of the true self. 3 Many countries (Australia, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Mexico, Norway, Poland, and many others) have mandatory pension schemes, either mandated by law or via labor market negotiations or contracts, requiring individuals to contribute a certain fraction of their income during their entire work career towards their own retirement. (OECD, 2015) . These range from 6% in New Zealand to 33% in Italy, once employer and employee mandates are added up. The contribution rates are typically age-independent, and is, therefore, the same for the young, the is our point of entry into this literature. We seek a welfare rationale for mandated pensions. We …nd that pension mandates are great commitment devices, e¤ective at raising retirement wealth not by compelling agents to raise their private saving but by forcing them to stop saving on their own! The customary way to restore policy e¤ectiveness in life cycle models is to assume, implicitly or explicitly, agents face borrowing constraints -see e.g. Feldstein (1985) , Laibson et. al (1998) , Feldstein and Leibman (2002) , Imrohoroglu et. al. (2003) , and Cremer et. al. (2008) . Under this assumption, the government mandates a su¢ ciently-high level of pension saving, enough to compel agents to stop saving on their own and, yet, not be allowed to borrow; from this point on, further increases in the mandate generate a proportional increase in retirement saving. We argue the no-borrowing constraint assumption is not entirely innocuous. Our reasoning is simple: in the natural course of a lifecycle, as has been well documented, agents facing a hump-shaped income pro…le are net borrowers when young, net savers when middle aged, and dissavers when old -see, for example, Figure 3 In Figure 1a , we document the distribution of the entire Danish population of wage earners in 2014 according to their mandatory contribution rates (into mandated, funded individual retirement middle-aged and those close to retirement. One exception is Switzerland which has employee pension contribution rates increasing with age (four age groups) rising from 7% for individual in the age group 25-34 to 18% for the age group 55-65 (55-64 for women). Bateman et. al (2001) contains a detailed review of mandatory saving schemes across OECD countries. accounts). Evidently, more than 70% of wage earners contribute excess of 10% of their earned income into such schemes. A model which imposes a no-borrowing constraint, especially on the young, and uses it to rationalize mandatory pensions is therefore at odds with the well-known borrowing and saving characteristics of the life cycle. The challenge, we take up, is to o¤er a welfare rationale for mandatory pensions in an otherwise standard life-cycle model with present-biased preferences without imposing any borrowing constraints. 5 Since most countries that impose mandatory pension contributions do so in an age-independent fashion, our question becomes extra challenging, how to rationalize such saving mandates on the young who also happen to be natural borrowers? 6 At …rst glance, it would appear mandates of the de…ned contribution type (individual accounts) should not matter; after all, they do not change the present value of (disposable) income, only its time pro…le. If capital markets are imperfect -here, we mean, the direction in which income shifts across time a¤ects its opportunity cost -then the time pro…le of income matters, and marginal utility of consumption across time is not equalized. 7 How, then, can such mandates be welfare enhancing? As we explain below, present-bias in preferences, in conjunction with capital market imperfections, is key.
We conduct our analysis in a standard three-period lifecycle model. Homogeneous agents face an exogenous, hump-shaped income pro…le and are assumed to have present-biased choice preferencesquasi-hyperbolic (time-inconsistent) preferences and myopia; their true preferences admit standard discounting but no short-sightedness or myopia. 8 We assume the agents are sophisticated: they understand their impending preference reversal and respond to it. The consumption-loan market is imperfect -there is an "interest gap", the borrowing rate exceeds the saving rate (which, in turn, exceeds unity), both exogenously speci…ed. The pension scheme is of the mandatory, de…nedcontribution type with individual accounts and can admit age-speci…c contribution rates. Agents face no borrowing constraints; indeed, they may borrow against their future income and pension wealth. The government is benevolent and chooses pension contribution rate(s) to maximize lifetime utility of the true young self.
Our results con…rm that present-biased preferences imply the young borrow too much and the middle-aged save too little relative to what the true young self would want. This sets the stage for government intervention. Under mild conditions on the extent of present-biasedness and the size of the interest gap, we show there may be a welfare case for mandating the middle-aged and the young to contribute to their retirement savings, even with age-independent contribution rates. 9 And this 5 Goda et.al (2015) present evidence on the ubiquity of present-biasedness (roughly, 55%) seen in Americans. They also …nd a robust negative relationship between between retirement savings and the extent of present-bias. 6 By natural borrowers, we mean the young facing a hump-shaped income pro…le would want to borrow even if their preferences were not present-biased. 7 In particular, the marginal utility of young-age consumption is higher (relative to the perfect markets case), if the young want to front-load consumption but are restrained from so doing (say, due to a higher interest rate on borrowing relative to saving, and/or an explicit borrowing constraint). Mandating the young to save, therefore, reduces their current disposable income and utility, misaligning marginal utility of consumption across the life-cycle even further. 8 Bounded rationality can also be perceived as a so-called self-control problem -see Pesendorfter (2001, 2004) . For an analysis of the design of pension schemes under such preferences in two-period overlapping generations models, see St-Amant and Garon (2015). 9 If present-biasedness is absent, there is no role for mandated pensions -true and choice preferences agree -and is consistent with the young simultaneously borrowing and saving (via mandated pensions), albeit at di¤erent opportunity costs.
The larger issue is, given the low self-provision for retirement by the middle aged, how should policy be designed to boost old-age consumption? Simply mandating the middle-aged to save more, initially, has no e¤ect: they simply undo the mandate by cutting own saving. As mandated contributions rise, a point is reached where the middle-aged …nd themselves saving nothing voluntarily -the zero-saving corner. Further increases in contributions, within limits, raise overall (mandated plus voluntary) retirement saving beyond what voluntary saving could achieve alone. The true young self likes this.
The question is, with the middle-aged pinned at the zero-saving corner, should the young be co-opted in the larger mission of uplifting old-age consumption? The answer is, it depends. A pension mandate on the young raises future pension wealth and helps to raise old-age consumption, something the young true self appreciates. At the same time, though, it reduces current income for the young encouraging them to borrow more but not so much -because of the interest gapas to totally o¤set the gain in future pension wealth. How is the middle-aged a¤ected? The added cost of debt repayment tends to reduce the middle-aged self's consumption, contrary to what his true young self would have wanted. Therein lies the trade-o¤, boost old-age consumption but hurt middle-age consumption. This is why present-bias is necessary but not su¢ cient to rationalize mandated saving; the extent of the credit market imperfection is crucial.
What insight do we glean from the discussion above? In our setup, e¤ectiveness of a mandated pension relies on it being aggressive enough to induce the middle-aged from saving on their own! The task of ensuring the retired have su¢ cient savings is to be taken up solely by the government. This insight must appear counterintuitive; why is it not optimal to have both the government mandate and voluntary saving by the middle-aged? The answer lies in the present-bias. The government wants the young self to contribute to future pension wealth (and hence, old-age consumption) but it is aware the young sophisticated self will borrow against that future wealth and in ‡uence the middle-aged self to save less. However, if the middle-aged can be pinned at the zero-saving corner, then, unless the policy is too pushy, the actions of the young self will leave no mark on the middle-aged. They continue to save nothing on their own merely contributing to their retirement as mandated. The take-away is that mandatory pensions work by relieving the middle-aged of the task of self-provision for retirement, which, in e¤ect, renders their present-bias inconsequential.
We turn to a quick review of the literature. Imrohoroglu et. al (2003) is a seminal work studying the desirability of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes for naive, quasi-hyperbolic discounters, assuming no borrowing is possible. In that case, unfunded schemes yield no bene…t and may hurt, as is often the case, they are return-dominated by private saving. Our analysis is an apples-toapples comparison between private saving and mandatory saving, each bearing the same rate of return; this means a shift from voluntary to mandated saving has no return consequences. 10 In there is no over/under saving problem to correct. 1 0 Cremer and Pestieu (2011) consider a PAYG scheme in a two-period model with homogeneous agents where, in the absence of a no-borrowing constraint, there is no welfare case for such pensions. Their concern is more about an insightful new paper, Findley and Caliendo (2016) extend the Imrohoroglu et. al (2003) line of work to allow for borrowing, as well, like us, a spread between borrowing and saving rates.
In a lot of ways, their paper is very similar in spirit as ours, except they use a continuous-time OG structure with time-invariant wage income, and as such, cannot make meaningful statements concerning di¤erent magnitudes of responses to saving mandates by the young and the middle-aged. Malin (2008) considers the implications of pay-as-you-go social security acting as a ‡oor on savings in a model with heterogenous, time-inconsistent agents. In our setup, a uniform ‡oor will bind for some levels of present-biasedness but not all because the scheme is fully funded.
A relatively large empirical literature has analyzed how household savings is a¤ected by incentives and mandated saving requirements. In particular, the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) programs in the US have been much researched. A symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives summarizes the …ndings and shows the di¤erence in opinions and results based on analyses of the very same programs -see Hubbard and Skinner (1996) , Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) . The consensus appears to be, such incentives may increase saving, but the relevant elasticities are small, suggesting many agents are not for them, an increase in mandated saving leads to a one-to-one increase in total savings, with no adjustment in other forms of savings. (One can think of these people as behaving like agents at the zero-saving corner alluded to above.) About 15% respond to the mandated savings requirement mainly by changing other forms of savings, i.e., their total savings is not much a¤ected.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the three-period model while Section 3 derives the saving decisions of the young and the middle-aged when savings and borrowing rates di¤er. As a prelude to the full-blown analysis for the entire lifecycle, Section 4 studies a welfare rationale for mandated pensions in a two-period model. The role for mandated pension savings in the life-cycle model is considered in Section 5, including an analysis of whether there can be a welfare rationale for mandating the young to save for pensions, and whether there is a welfare rationale even if the contribution rate is age-independent. Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs and some additional material are relegated to the appendix. redistribution via a PAYG scheme (seen most clearly, in the case where all agents are non-myopic) and not about whether such schemes solve the present-bias problem.
The model 2.1 Preliminaries
To capture the essentials of the life-cycle pattern of borrowing and saving, we consider a simple, three-period lifecycle model. 11 Population size is held …xed. 12 A representative agent lives through three phases, young (y), middle-aged (m) and old (o), and is endowed with exogenous incomes w y > 0 and w m (> w y ) during youth and middle-age respectively, and nothing when old -in other words, a hump-shaped income pro…le in accordance with stylized facts. At times, we will interchangeably refer to these phases as selves, where Self 1 (young self) is the young phase, and so on. Agents have access to a capital market where the gross return on saving is R (> 1) but the borrowing rate is R b R > 1 : borrowing faces a higher opportunity cost than saving. 13 ' 14 All borrowing and saving is for consumption purposes only.
We allow agents to act myopically and have quasi-hyperbolic preferences (exhibit time-inconsistent behavior). We draw a distinction between the "true" and "choice" utility of agents. Agents' behavior is dictated by their choice utility, but their actual well-being, our measure of welfare, is governed by the true lifetime utility. 15 Let c y denote consumption as young, c m denote consumption as middle-aged, and c o be consumption as old. The "true" preferences, with a "*", de…ned over consumption in each period of life is the standard, separable
where 2 [0; 1]. The felicity function u( ) is assumed to ful…ll standard assumptions, including u 0 ( ) > 0 and u 00 ( ) < 0 and Inada conditions. 16 Our yardstick of welfare is ; the lifetime true utility of Self 1. The choice preferences when young (of Self 1) are given as
1 1 Three periods are necessary and su¢ cient to capture the essence of the natural life-cycle pattern (borrowing as young, saving as middle-aged and dissaving as old). The model is deliberately kept barebones so as to reveal the intuition in stark fashion. Ignored are heterogenities in income or present-biasedness (as in Malin, 2008) , mortality risk, uncertainty, bequest motives, retirement decisions, transactions costs, among others. 1 2 It is unproblematic to allow for young or middle-age mortality when perfect annuities markets are present. In the presence of market imperfections additional issues arise since the mandated pension scheme may (partially) overcome this market failure if it o¤ers life-annuities, see e.g. Eckstein et al (1985) . This points to market imperfections as a separate reason for public intervention, which we leave out to focus on the implications of present-biased preferences. 1 3 Letting R b ! 1 generates a no-borrowing constraint as a special case. 1 4 Note that our assumption on returns make incomes "imperfect substitutes" over time in the case of borrowing! To make voluntary and mandatory savings non-perfect substitutes, Gale and Scholz (1994) presents a three-period OLG model where they introduce income uncertainty in period 2 which creates a precautionary demand for saving that is not satis…ed by tied pension savings. Chetty et al (2014) introduces a speci…c utility gain from the ‡exibility available with voluntary saving. 1 5 Findley and Caliendo (2016) consider other welfare criteria. 1 6 In some places below, we illustrate some results for a logarithmic utility function, i.e. u( ) = ln( ). and of Self 2 (when middle-aged) as
where 2 [0; 1], and e .
Note < 1 represents quasi-hyperbolic preferences which generate time inconsistency (preference reversal) since the marginal rate of substitution (M.R.S) between consumption as middle-aged and old from the view point of Self 1, @cm @co j young = u 0 (co) u 0 (cm) and the same M.R.S @cm @co j middle-aged = u 0 (co) u 0 (cm) = e u 0 (co) u 0 (cm) from the point of view of Self 2 are not the same (Laibson,1997) . Also, if present bias arises solely due to myopia ( = 1; = e ) there is no di¤erence in the MRS's, and therefore, no preference reversal. Similarly, if = but < 1; there is no myopia but preference reversal persists. In Figure 2 , the true preferences of Self 1 for c m and c o are shown by the green indi¤erence curve, with discount factor : The blue indi¤erence curve captures Self 1's preferences for the same with corresponding discount factor < . For Self 2: the red curve captures his choice preferences over c m and c o ; that which he as middle-aged uses to make decisions, with an attached discount factor, = e < : respective incomes. 17 This means, pension-mandated (henceforth "mandatory") saving is y w y and m w m for the young and middle-aged respectively. The gross return on the pension contribution is 1 7 The government is assumed to pre-commit to these contribution rates. For an insightful analysis of these issues in the absence of such precommittment, see Findley and Caliendo (2014) . R (R > 1), i.e., the mandatory scheme o¤ers the same return as voluntary saving. 18 The individual is entitled to a pension bene…t (P ) in the third period where
The agents are assumed to perceive the relationship between their contributions and the bene…t they receive. The agent considers his entire future pension wealth, P; as something he can borrow against. 19 Denoting voluntary saving as young by s y and saving as middle-aged by s m , consumption as old is
as middle-aged is,
and as young by
If s y 0 and s m 0, (no borrowing as young and middle-aged) the present value of lifetime income is I ss (1 y )w y + (1 m)wm R + P R 2 = w y + wm R which holds because the agent is cognizant of the link between his contributions and eventual bene…ts. In this case, pension contribution rates do not in ‡uence the budget sets of the various selves. However, if s y < 0 and s m 0, the present value of lifetime income is given by
here, which is why the contribution rates in ‡uence budget sets. If both s y ; s m < 0, then the present value of lifetime income is I bb which means an increase in borrowing is simply an increase in b y : Then,
3 Voluntary saving
Middle-aged saving
We focus on so-called sophisticated myopics, that is, we posit Self 1 is aware Self 2's decisions are based on (3) and not on u (c m ) + u (c o ). 20 Evidently, it most challenging to rationalize mandatory pensions for sophisticated myopics.
The …rst order of business is to characterize the individual saving decisions as young and middleaged for given contribution rates. We will proceed in the usual backward way -the perceptionperfect strategy of O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) -by …nding optimal saving s m for the middle-aged
given borrowing by the young, b y ; and incorporating that response back into the borrowing decision of the young. Figure 3 . Since R b > R; there is a kink in the budget set (the bold green line segments) at s m = 0: Also note,
That is a middle-aged saver can be thought of as having income w m R b b y from which he puts away D : m w m is the mandatory savings part and s m is the voluntary savings part, and importantly, each part earns the same return. Using P = R 2 y w y + R m w m ; we can also write c o = P + Rs m = R 2 y w y + RD which clari…es that a middle aged saver cares about total-saving, D; not its composition. Given a b y ; Self 2's choice utility is given by
The relevant …rst order condition is
The second-order condition is satis…ed given the assumptions made on u. Self 2 is at a corner with zero voluntary savings, i.e., s m = 0, if
which, it is noteworthy, holds for a range of b y : 21 Note, the saving vs. no-saving regime cuto¤s depend on the pension contribution rates. 22 This means that increases in contribution rates may change the identity of a middle-aged agent from a saver to a non-saver. We will return to this shortly. Figure 3 illustrate the cases where the middle-aged is a voluntary saver, at a zero saving corner, or is borrowing. 23 It can be checked (from (6)),
Higher borrowing by Self 1 (higher b y ) reduces starting wealth for Self 2 -reduces Y and shrinks the budget set, see the dotted green lines -who reacts by decreasing his saving for consumption smoothing reasons. This is the wealth e¤ect. To foreshadow, all else same, the government by incentivizing the young to raise b y reduces voluntary saving by the middle-aged; this hurts the middle-aged.
Borrowing by the young
The sophisticated Self 1 takes the saving behavior of his future self into account and …gures out his best response. Lifetime choice utility as perceived by Self 1 is
is determined by (6) . The …rst-order condition reads
2 1 To avoid discontinuities, Findley and Caliendo (2016) "smooth" away the interest rate spread. This allows them to stay away from zero-saving corners that are in ‡uential in our discussion. In other words, the agents in their model cannot be "passive" in the sense of Chetty. et. al (2014) as each one of them would actively respond to changes in the policy. 2 2 Of course, if y = m = 0, the middle-aged will save at any R to ensure some consumption when old. 2 3 Note the zero saving corner is not due to "prodigality" as in Pestieau and Possen (2008) where some choose not to save knowing they will be bailed out later by the government.
The second order condition is assumed to hold.
At …rst sight it may appear, given s m > 0 was optimally chosen by the middle-aged, the term attached to @D(by) @by -capturing how the saving decision of the middle-aged is in ‡uenced by the young -must get washed out by the envelope theorem. Not so here. The reason is the preference reversal: how the young views intertemporal substitution between middle and old age, and sets u 0 (c m ) + Ru 0 (c o ) = 0 with attached discount rate , is not how the middle-aged (see eq. (6)) views the same (and sets u 0 (c m ) + e Ru 0 (c o ) = 0 with discount rate e ). Here, an additional term emerges so that
Since Self 1 and Self 2 disagree on the correct discount factor, speci…cally > e ; we have u 0 (c m )+ Ru 0 (c o ) > 0 (instead of (9)) and since @D(by) @by < 0, the underscored term -call it Q(b y ) -is positive, adding to the previously-discussed marginal cost, thereby raising the total marginal cost of borrowing. This extra cost arises because Self 1's borrowing restricts the feasible set for Self 2 and because Self 1 and Self 2 disagree on the correct discount factor, both of which the sophisticated Self 1 must internalize. This means Self 1 is made better o¤ by choosing a lower level of borrowing, as clear from Figure 4 .
Alternatively, use (8) and (9) to get
Notice, the term e @D(by) @by appears because the sophisticated Self 1 correctly anticipates the upcoming preference reversal; hence, the envelope theorem does not apply. 24 Curiously, notice if @D(by) @by = 0 (which happens when s m = 0; the zero-saving corner), then preference reversal has no bite! If Self 1 cannot in ‡uence Self 2's saving by changing his own borrowing, the only instrument in his arsenal, then whether Self 1 anticipates the preference reversal or not makes no di¤erence.
To foreshadow, if the government can keep the middle-aged at the zero-saving corner, then, in a sense, it has cured that agent of the preference-reversal problem. The discussion above makes clear that Self 1 is made better o¤ by cutting borrowing. What impact does this have on Self 2? In Figure 5 , Self 1 (using the blue indi¤erence curve) would like Self 2 to consume at point B. However, Self 2 using the red indi¤erence curve (which is steeper, since > e ) prefers point A. Knowing this, Self 1 can in ‡uence the budget set of Self 2 by cutting borrowing (from b y to b 0 y ). It is apparent from the …gure this shifts out the budget set, allowing Self 2 to, say, choose point C. As drawn, Self 1 has, via this action, ensured Self 2 chooses the same c 0 as Self 1 would have liked (as per point B). Intuitively, what is going on here is that the preference reversal, via the tilting of the indi¤erence curves (from blue to red) causes a "substitution e¤ect" which hurts Self 1; the former responds by transferring some income (reduced b y ) to Self 2, an "income e¤ect", to help Self 2 save more for old-age which, in turn helps Self 1. This comes at a cost: consumption during middle age is higher, and by implication, it is smaller as young -after all, point C may not be optimal.
In passing, recall that the entire analysis above was predicated on Self 1 being a borrower. We show that Lemma 1 Self 1 is a borrower if w y is su¢ ciently small relative to w m :
In Appendix B, we show that a su¢ cient condition for Self 1 to borrow is that his income as young not be too large. 25 Henceforth, we assume the conditions spelled out in Lemma 1 hold in the rest of the paper.
Changes in the contribution rates
How do the middle-aged react to an increase in their contribution rate? Note
meaning, total-saving is una¤ected -the agent, as alluded to above, does not care about the composition of total-saving and therefore o¤sets any increase in mandatory saving by cutting his voluntary saving. It follows,
This is a restatement of a well-known, policy ine¤ectiveness result -see Gale, 1998 -on the neutrality of fully-funded pension schemes. The implication is stark and important: unless the middle-aged is at the zero-saving corner, changes in the pension contribution rate have no e¤ect on his retirement saving (the pension o¤set is a full 100%). If the agent is a saver, his presentbiasedness and freedom to borrow against the future will goad him to undo any e¤ort by the government aimed at boosting his saving. At the zero corner, however, he is pinned; he cannot continue o¤setting the mandate, and hence, his present-biasedness is rendered harmless. 26 Lemma 2 When middle-aged saving is positive,
and when it is at the zero corner, s m = 0 : @by @ y > 0 @sm @ y = 0 @by @ m = 0 @sm @ m = 0 :
As discussed above, when the middle-aged are savers, a higher m levied on the middle-aged has no e¤ect on b y of the young or D for middle-aged. On the other hand, a higher contribution rate on the young, y ; induced the young to borrow more -lower young income (net of pension contributions) and higher retirement income both induce borrowing, but the crowding out is not complete because borrowing has a higher opportunity return. Self 1 leaves Self 2 (the middle-aged) a lower starting wealth inducing the latter to further reduce saving. In passing, note that if the middle aged were borrowing, then an increase in m would cause them to borrow even more, which would bring down their old-age consumption -such an increase in m is, of course, counterproductive, our goal being to raise, not reduce old-age consumption. This explains why a government would not want to raise m so high as to drive the middle-aged to borrow.
Undersaving
We want to establish that in the absence of policy, agents "undersave" both as young and middleaged, i.e., they borrow "too much" as young and save "too little" as middle-aged: b y > b y and s m < s m where the * denotes solutions derived using true utilities, .
We continue to restrict focus on young borrowers. Under laissez faire, voluntary saving as middle-aged will be strictly positive (they are "natural savers" -after all, this is the only way to ensure some consumption as old): The saving decision of the middle-aged is determined us-
Ru 0 (Rs m ) = 0; the di¤erence between the two problems, given a b y ; is just that the true preferences use while the choice preferences use e : Similarly, borrowing as young, b y ; is derived from
In this case, the di¤erence between the two problems is more substantial: the sophisticated young under choice preferences has to contend with the fact that his middle-aged self will attempt to undo his action -a concern that arises only because of time-inconsistency, which the young under true preferences does not have to contend with. Intuitively, a present-biased young agent would want to borrow more than his true young self would. However, this would leave his present-biased Self 2 with a lower starting wealth legitimizing Self 2's choice of lower saving, lower than what true Self 2 would have wanted. If mandatory pensions are to be justi…ed, then they have to help reduce the severity of this "undersaving" problem.
A welfare case for mandatory pensions: The two period model
As a prelude to the analysis of the full life-cycle model, it is useful to study the two-period case 27 (middle-aged and old) so as to clarify the key roles played by the crowding-out of private savings and the capital market structure. The two-period model is also the most commonly studied in the Figure 6 illustrates 29 how savings 2 7 It arises as a special case of the three period model by setting by = y = 0 and eliminating consumption when young from the life-time utility function. 2 8 Note that s m > sm follows straightforwardlly in the two-period case, since > e and savings are determined by u 0 (wm s m ) = R u 0 (Rs m ) and u 0 (wm sm) = R e u 0 (Rsm), respectively. 2 9 For m > m; voluntary saving and old-age consumption are, of course, not, in general, linear in m. For the optimal level of mandatory pensions savings ( m ) we have: The logic for the …rst part of Proposition 2 follows from the discussion above. Voluntary saving by the middle-aged is crowded out one-to-one: present-biased agents do not agree that saving should be increased, and the returns on voluntary and mandatory savings are the same. Mandatory pension savings becomes e¤ective only when voluntary saving is driven to the zero corner, at which point there is no crowding out and total saving (and old age consumption) can be increased.
Can we justify a m at which the middle-aged are driven to borrow? The intuition is that borrowing takes place at a higher rate than what saving earns, which reduces old age consumption and true utility. The need to borrow arises due to the con ‡ict between true and choice utility.
The undoing of the mandate is governed by choice utility: the agent is attempting to counter the forced shift of consumption, possibly from middle to old-age, by borrowing to "protect"middle-age consumption even though it results in lower old-age consumption. This is why there is never a welfare case for a m where the middle-aged are driven to borrow.
To see this cleanly, consider Figure 7a Note, true utility (see the ‡atter, green indi¤erence curve) is maximized at A* on the segment QAK. It is also apparent true utility can never be maximum except on the segment QAK. In particular, any policy trying to get the agent close to A* cannot hope to succeed if it incentivizes him to locate in the interior of the set QAK. If m is raised slightly beyond m to say, 1 m ; the budget set shrinks further to QBF. Now the agent chooses point B (since A is no longer attainable), still at the zero-saving corner. Clearly, B has less c m and more c o than at point A. B is also closer to A*, the optimal point from the standpoint of true preferences.
Figure 7b: An over ambitious m
It is also clear why being too aggressive with raising m is a bad idea -see Figure 7b . If m crosses m ; to say, 2 m ; the budget set shrinks further to QVF' and now the agent …nds point B more desirable than point V (on the lower, dashed red indi¤erence curve; V is at the zero-saving corner). Furthermore, point B necessitates borrowing, leaving the agent with even less c o than before (hence, defeating the entire purpose of the mandated scheme!) Notice, how the agent is taken further away from A* with such strong a mandate: true utility would have been higher if point V could be chosen.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows, it is possible to implement the optimal level of savings s m (one maximizing true life-time utility
Intuitively, any m 2 ( m ; m ] can be implemented; since agents are driven to the zero-saving corner in this range, any such m also delivers higher utility than under laissez-faire. Indeed, the m consistent with optimal saving (s m ) must also lie in this interval. The gap between the level of laissez-faire and optimal saving is clearly larger, the larger the ratio of the subjective discount rates, e . The zero-saving interval is wider, the bigger the ratio R b R . Hence, the condition e R b > R essentially renders the zero-saving interval wide enough to place s m in the interior.
Figure 7c: Importance of gap between R and R b
Proposition 2 also shows that present-biased preferences are necessary but not su¢ cient to derive a welfare case for mandatory pensions. The capital market imperfection is also crucial. Consider Figure 7c where the budget set under perfect capital markets is QA*K and the agent chooses point A. If there is a small gap between R and R b , the budget set becomes QA*K 1 causing the agent to move to W. However, if the market imperfection is su¢ ciently strong, the relevant budget set would be, say, QA*K 2 ; in which case, the agent would choose point A* -in this case, the true optimal saving level can be implemented. Increasing R b for a given R increases the interval where the zero corner arises thereby creating a welfare case for mandatory pensions. In the limit, letting R b ! 1 (no borrowing allowed, as in most of the literature discussed in the introduction) eliminates borrowing, and as such, old-age consumption is monotonically increasing in the contribution rate (above m ). In that case, the optimal saving level can always be implemented.
The above discussion makes clear that it matters to what extent agents can undo the mandates on pension saving by borrowing. Our assumption, R b > R; restricts but does not eliminate such undoing. One may think of alternative restrictions on the ability to borrow against future pension wealth. Qualitatively, all such restrictions would e¤ectively yield the same sort of implication, producing a zero-saving corner which, again, would prevent the agent from fully undoing the mandate. 30 Our …nding that there is never a welfare case for policy mandates compelling the middle-aged to borrow suggests the answer to the title of the paper should be, no. The answer to the question, it turns out, is not that simple, for reasons developed in the next section.
Mandatory pension contributions
Could there ever be a welfare case for mandating the young to save when they are simultaneously borrowing, that too, at a higher rate? Since most mandated pension schemes have age-independent contribution rates, there is the additional question of whether such age-constrained schemes can improve welfare.
Any welfare case for mandated pensions must rest on voluntary saving for old age being too low -see Proposition 1. In the two-period model of Section 4, we show it is always possible to increase This imperative, however, has to be balanced against the consideration that the young are natural borrowers and do not like the borrowing restriction. 31 To see this more clearly, for the moment set y = 0 and focus on the imposition of m : What governs the choice of such a m ? Recall, if the middle-aged have positive voluntary savings, an increase in m is o¤set one-for-one by a decline in voluntary saving thereby keeping total saving, and hence true utility, unchanged. Once m has been raised su¢ ciently, voluntary saving is driven to the zero corner, and from there on, crowding out is absent and any further increases in m raises total saving via increases in the mandated part. This increase in total saving helps true utility. What might mandating some contribution from the young do? Since the middle-aged are at the zero voluntary savings corner, ceteris paribus, an increase in future pension wealth induces the young to borrow more. Under our assumptions, the middle-aged remain pinned at the zero voluntary saving corner while total saving for old age rises. The higher borrowing by the young, that too at the higher rate (R b ), hurts true utility but that is counterbalanced by the gain in true utility resulting from higher total saving. Mandating saving on the middle-aged would provide them much-needed commitment but should the young be left alone or co-opted into this? This tension is the subject matter of the rest of the paper.
To set the scene, consider the e¤ect on welfare from changing the pension contribution rates for the young and the middle-aged. Continue to focus on a case with b y > 0 and s m > 0: True utility using (1) and substituting in consumption levels in terms of b y and s m is
It follows that 
The term w y @by @ y comprises of two parts: the part w y adds to pension wealth when old; the part @by @ y captures the e¤ect of a change in the young's contribution rate on the starting wealth of the middle-aged. The term w m + @sm @ m captures the e¤ect of a change in the middle-aged's contribution rate on pension wealth of the old. These terms capture the direct budget e¤ects of the contribution rates. In addition, there are indirect e¤ects arising from the interaction between the saving decisions of the young and middle-aged captured in s . For example, a higher y induces the middle-aged to save less ( @sm @ y < 0) which hurts true welfare since the middle-aged were undersaving ( e > 0) to begin with. Similarly, for the other indirect e¤ects.
It is di¢ cult to derive analytical results on the optimal combination of y and m maximizing social welfare satisfying (13)- (14) . Part of the reason for this di¢ culty is the presence of the term, s ; which, at this level of generality, is a function of y and m : Below, we make the assumption that u is homothetic, in which case, s becomes independent of the contribution rates. In that case, we are able to pursue two manageable questions of great policy signi…cance. First, is there ever a welfare case for imposing mandatory pension contributions on young borrowers ( y > 0) if the middle-aged are already mandated (optimally) to save for pensions, m > 0? Put another way, could it be optimal to impose a y > 0, rather than setting a higher m ? If the answer is a¢ rmative, it establishes that the optimal policy has both y > 0 and m > 0 (in general y 6 = m ). Second, assuming the contribution rate cannot be made age-dependent (i.e., it must be that y = m = must hold), is there a welfare case for introducing a mandatory pension scheme ( > 0)? If the answer is a¢ rmative, it would imply that the possible net costs from mandating the young to contribute the same as the middle-aged do not dominate the overall welfare gains made by mandatory pensions savings. In either case, the young will, both, save for pensions and borrow.
Should the young be mandated to save for pensions?
We pursue this research question in the following way. Consider a situation where there is only an optimal mandated contribution requirement on the middle-aged (age-dependent contribution rates are m > 0; y = 0). We show in Appendix F that the middle-aged voluntarily save for m < a m , and are at the zero saving corner for a m < m . As outlined above, we assume henceforth a m ] such that middle-aged have zero voluntary savings but total oldage saving is increased and true utility is higher than under laissez-faire.
(ii) When the middle-aged are at a corner with zero voluntary savings, true utility can be improved by a positive mandated contribution rate for the young, i.e. @ @ y j y =0 > 0 for a m < m < a m under the su¢ cient condition that e > The …rst part of Proposition 3 is a straightforward generalization of Proposition 2 from the two-period case. A contribution rate below a m < 0 is ine¤ective in raising total saving, since there is complete crowding out. Choosing a m > a m drives voluntary saving by the middle-aged to the zero corner, and mandated saving raises total savings, and this improves true utility. Setting m > a m is not optimal since it drives the middle-aged to borrow and old-age consumption to fall (see Lemma 2) .
The second part of Proposition 3 is more interesting. It …nds, in a setting with zero, voluntary middle-age saving (meaning any saving is mandated), welfare may be raised by mandating contributions by the young as well. This makes intuitive sense: the middle-aged are already at a corner and requiring the young to save unambiguously increases saving for old age which is desirable due to its sobering e¤ect on the undersaving problem. Of course, mandating the young reduces their consumption, also desirable from a welfare perspective, except it leads them to borrow more (at a rate exceeding that on saving). That curtails middle-age consumption. Therefore, a trade-o¤ arises between the gain from increasing old-age consumption and the cost in terms of borrowing. A su¢ cient condition for imposing welfare-enhancing mandatory saving requirements on the young is e > R 2 b R 2 , i.e., the present bias in preferences should be su¢ ciently strong compared to the return di¤erence.
Why is mandating the young to save conceptually di¤erent from mandating the middle-aged?
Mandating the young to save for pensions increases old-age consumption (with the middle-aged at the zero corner), and that may increase welfare. But requiring the middle-aged to save for pensions may cause them to borrow which, unambiguously, reduces old-age consumption and, hence, defeats the purpose for the mandates.
The …nal part of Proposition 3 argues that a pre-committed choice of ( y ; m ) cannot simultaneously correct the overborrowing problem of the young and the undersaving problem of the middle-aged. Mandated saving policies can help reduce the severity of the latter, as we have seen, but the overborrowing problem is made worse by the gap between R b and R: Broadly speaking, which is more crucial, helping with the undersaving problem of the middle-aged or the overborrowing problem of the young? Two issues arise here. First, standard discounting would suggest over/under "errors" matter more when the agent has one period left versus when he has two. But counter to that logic is the notion that borrowing "errors" face a higher opportunity cost since R b > R: 32 
Age-independent contribution rates
Impose, further, the restriction that = y = m , that is, the contribution rate has to be ageindependent. Is there a welfare case for introducing mandatory pensions savings under this restriction? This restriction makes the task at hand harder. On the other hand, if a welfare case exists even under this restriction, it is a strong validation for imposing mandates on the young.
In line with above, we have that the middle-aged have positive saving if < , negative savings for > and are at the corner with zero savings for
; c.f. Appendix F. Note evaluating for = 0 implies the "starting position" is one where the middle-aged are savers ( < ). We The result is proved in Appendix F. Following previous insights we …nd that a potential welfare case for mandatory pension saving arises when the middle-aged are at the zero corner. However, 3 2 Guo and Caliendo (2014) argue that a time-inconsistent mandated saving policy, one which deviates from the stated ( y ; m) and "misleads" the middle-aged as to their required contribution rate, may deliver the optimal (b y ; s m ). this is not automatic for two reasons. First, even when the middle-aged are at the zero-saving corner, welfare is not necessarily increasing in the contribution rate. A su¢ cient condition for this to be the case is that e > R b R , i.e. the present bias should be su¢ cient strong relative to the return di¤erences. Second, even if this condition holds, a welfare case for a positive contribution rate has not been made; after all, welfare is decreasing in the contribution rate when the middle-aged have positive saving because a higher contribution rate does not raise old-age consumption as the saving of both the young and the middle-aged are crowded out. A welfare case for a positive contribution rate thus requires a 2 ( ; ] such that
Clearly, it is, in general, an open question whether the condition (15) is ful…lled.
The log-utility case (see Eqs. (20)- (21) in Appendix D which hold for b y > 0 and s m > 0) can be used to illustrate the e¤ects of an age-independent contribution rate. Figure 8 shows how true life-time utility depends on the age-independent contribution rate. Starting from zero, increasing the contribution rate decreases welfare. This is the case as long as voluntary savings by the middleaged is positive. Upon reaching a contribution rate where the middle-aged are at the zero savings corner, welfare starts increasing. Note, for the particular case shown, welfare is higher with a positive contribution rate, i.e. condition (15) holds. The standard life-cycle pattern of consumption and saving is that the young borrow and the middleaged are net-savers. Present-biased preferences imply the young borrow too much, and the middle-aged save too little compared to the optimal choices under the true preferences of the young. This provides an argument for mandatory pension savings, not only for the middle-aged but also for the young. This holds even if the contribution rate is constrained to be age-independent. We show why present-bias is necessary but not su¢ cient to rationalize mandated saving; the extent of the credit market imperfection is crucial. Moreover, we show that the welfare case for mandated pension savings does not rely on the speci…c source (myopia or hyperbolic discounting) of present-biased preferences. This is reassuring from a policy perspective, since it can be di¢ cult to empirically distinguish between the two.
Are pension mandates Pareto-improving? Consider the notion of Pareto e¢ ciency de…ned on multiple selves discussed in Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) . There, an allocation is Pareto ine¢ cient if there exists another feasible allocation which makes at least one self better o¤ and no self worse o¤. In our setting, consider as a starting point, the allocation -call it laissez faire -chosen by a sophisticated myopic Self 1. (No feasible allocation, of course, can improve upon the choice utility of the naive Self 1). Our results show, another allocation, one involving mandatory contribution rates on both the young and the middle-aged, improves on laissez faire true utility of Self 1. What about Self 2? Self 2 clearly bene…ts from the commitment value of mandatory saving but it is also true that, under mandatory pensions, his consumption is lowered (even though his future self, Self 3 has higher consumption and is happier). On net, it is not obvious whether Self 2 is necessarily happier than under laissez faire. In short, it is not obvious whether pension mandates constitute a Pareto improvement.
How would our results change if we allowed for endogenous factor prices? Suppose we allowed for neoclassical production using capital (and labor) as inputs so that under competitive markets, the wage rate and the interest rate on saving depended, in a standard way, on the capital-labor ratio as in a Diamond model. In such a setting, a higher contribution rate imposed on the middle-aged would reduce their voluntary saving, one for one, while their pension funds hold proportionately more capital, leaving aggregate capital unchanged. 33 Again, as above, once the middle-aged are driven to a zero voluntary saving corner, aggregate capital (held entirely by the pension funds)
can go up, raising wages but lowering interest rates. These last two general-equilibrium e¤ects will complicate matters by changing the size of the pension itself, and so on. The central insight, that the middle-aged have to be driven to the corner for mandatory pensions to work, is untouched, though.
Our …ndings suggest optimal contribution rates are age-dependent, somewhat counter to what is observed. Our model is sparse, for one. Besides practical and administrative reasons, there is the argument that the life-cycle pattern for earnings will not be the same for all, and therefore a simple age-dependent system will not be able to capture individual heterogeneities. For this reason an important issue for future research is the implications of heterogeneity not only across the earnings dimension but also with respect to preferences. How should mandatory pension systems be designed if the degree of present-bias is di¤erent across the population (including that some may not su¤er from present bias). On a technical level, the latter may also be used to argue that discontinuities in saving at the individual level -the zero corner -may disappear at the aggregate level.
Finally, balance expansion -the simultaneous expansion of the asset (in our case, pension wealth) and liability side (say, household debt) of a balance sheet -may also have consequences for macroeconomic stability because assets and liabilities have di¤erent maturity structures, pension assets being highly illiquid, and available only after retirement and household debt is highly liquid and subject to recall -see Andre (2016). This angle is also worthy of separate inquiry.
Appendix
A Young-Naive
The sophisticated young realize that they will "change" preferences, the naive do not. Hence, in the case of the naive young we have to distinguish between planned savings as middle-aged (s p m ) in ‡uencing the savings decision as young, and the actual savings as middle-aged (s a m ). The di¤erence between s p m and s a m arises from the preference-reversal which the naive does not take into account.
Life-time utility as perceived when young reads
Hence, the naive expects savings as middle-aged to be determined by (the superscript p refers to planned, which will di¤er from actual)
Hence, the corner condition for middle-aged savings read:
or
It follows @s p m @b y = 8 > > > < > > > :
and @s p m @ m = 8 > < > :
The optimal savings decision as young is given as (notice that the envelope theorem applies in this case)
It is still the case, that savings is below the level chosen under the true preferences. Finally, actual savings by the middle-aged is determined by
Note that the "corner" condition (18) is unchanged since it depends on b y which is pre-determined.
It is now straightforward to show the main results of the paper carries over. First, assume y = 0, then @s y @ m = 0; @s a m @ m = w m for m < n m and hence @ @ m = 0 for m < n m . If the middle-aged are at the corner we have
Hence, for y = 0 there is a m > n m which increases welfare above laissez-faire. Suppose n m < m < n m , is there a welfare case for y > 0? We have
which is basically the same condition as in the case with sophisticated young.
B Borrowing by the young
The savings decision of the middle-aged (s m ) depends on borrowing as young (b y ), and this is perceived by the (sophisticated) young. Hence, the two decisions are interconnected. The main text works with the case where agents in the absence of mandatory pension savings are borrowers as young (b y > 0) and savers as middle-aged (s m > 0), since this is the case where the welfare rationale for mandatory savings (especially for the young) may be called into question. If the young are savers, there is no essential di¤erence between being young and middle-aged and thus between the two-and three-period model. In the absence of mandatory savings, it is trivial that the middle-aged are saving (s m > 0) since this is the only way of ensuring consumption when old. From the main text we have that
If @ @by j by=0 > 0 it follows that b y > 0 which in turn requires
Ru 0 (Rs m ) @s m @b y or using that e Ru 0 (Rs m ) = u 0 (w m s m )
h e i @s m @b y
Note that e R b h e i @sm @by < R b since @sm @by > R b . A su¢ cient condition ensuring b y > 0 is thus
where s m is determined from: u 0 (w m s m ) = R e u 0 (Rs m ), hence 0 < s m < w m . Hence, condition (19) holds if the wage as young is not too high, i.e. 
denote the solution b c y . For the true preferences we have that life-time utility depends on borrowing as young as
Evaluate this derivative, for the borrowing decision of the young under the choice preferences b c y @ @b y
where the inequality follows by noting that (recall e @D(by) @by
It follows b y < b y and, therefore, by implication s m > s m .
D The separate role of and
For future use in determining a welfare case for mandated saving, it is important to understand how saving by the di¤erent selves depend on the source of the present bias, i.e., the separate role of myopia ( ) and quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( < 1). It is easiest to see this in the context of a concrete example.
Log utility: If the utility function is u(c i ) = ln c i for i = y; m; o; then assuming b y > 0 and s m > 0, it can be checked that 
To see the role of quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( < 1 =) < e ); consider a decrease in ; which, for given e , corresponds to an increase in . It follows straightforwardly that @b y @ e < 0; @s m @ e > 0
i.e., hyperbolic discounting tends to decrease borrowing as young and raise saving as middle-aged. The intuition is, the sophisticated young perceives her middle-aged self will be present-biased and therefore saves too little. By decreasing borrowing when young, starting wealth as middle-aged increases, which in turn incentivizes the middle-aged to save more. Reduced borrowing (or increased saving) as young thus works as a commitment device which helps with the time inconsistency but not enough to remove the undersaving issue discussed above. Also note, the magnitude of these responses do depend on the contribution rates.
E Two period model
De…ne m as the contribution rate at which voluntary savings for the middle-aged is exactly zero, i.e.
Similarly, de…ne m as the contribution rate at which voluntary borrowing is exactly zero, i.e.
and hence using that w m + @sm @ m j sm>0 = 0 it follows that This proves that there exists a contribution rate for the middle-aged m > m > 0 which delivers higher welfare than in the absence of mandatory pensions savings. Finally, consider the case m > m , i.e. the contribution rate is so high that the middle-aged become borrowers (s m < 0) the situation is more complicated since private voluntary savings is no longer zero but negative. Increasing the contribution rate thus makes the middle-aged borrow, and it is not clear that welfare in net terms can be increased. We have
which follows from noting that we have shown that w m + @sm @ m j sm<0 > 0 and w m R+R b @sm @ m j sm<0 < 0. In short, welfare can never be improved by choosing a contribution rate implying that the middleaged borrow to undo part of the mandatory pension saving.
To consider the implementation of the …rst best, i.e. the savings level under the true preferences s m , de…ne m s m w m i.e. the contribution rate m implements the optimal savings level s m , if voluntary savings is zero. Since net saving is una¤ected by mandatory pension savings for m < m , it follows from s m > s m ( m = 0) that m > m . For m m m households will be at the corner, neither voluntary savings nor borrowing. This is the case if
Recall ( m w m = s m ) optimal savings is given by
The last inequality holds always, and the …rst requires e < R b R .
F Appendix: Age dependent contribution rates
The following considers whether the young should be mandated to contribute to pension savings, when there is mandatory pension contributions for the middle-aged ( m ). To this end we …rst need to establish that it is optimal to make the middle-aged contribute, and next consider whether the young should also be asked to contribute. Similar to above, de…ne a m and a m as the critical contribution rates which delineates the positive savings, savings corner and negative savings for the middle-aged, i.e. 
and the …rst-order condition reads
Note that @s m @s y j sm<0 = R b u 00 (c m )
implying that @sm @by > R b ; and hence it follows that 0 < b < R b R b e . With homothetic preferences b is independent of c m and c o .
Writing the …rst order condition for the borrowing and savings decisions we have
Writing this in matrix form we have This inequality holds if
For the middled-aged to at the zero savings corner we require u 0 (c o ) e R b > u 0 (c m ) > e Ru 0 (c o ) and hence a su¢ cient condition that @ @ y > 0 is
Implementing (b y ; s m ) Is it possible to implement the optimal choice under the true preferences (b y ; s m ) and the associated consumption levels (c y ; c m ; c o ) by some choice of y and m . To address this quesstion …rst write the consumption levels for the optimal choices under the true preferences, i.e. 
Combining (23) and (24) 
